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Abstract
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by Michiko OGAKU
This dissertation analyses the relationship between information and the designs of
managerial incentive contracts and aims at a better understanding of moral hazard.
The designs of managerial incentive contracts differ from one country to another.
Such differences might reflect the characteristics of various managerial labour markets.
This is because managerial labour markets indicate the value of managers as human
capital and that can be characterised by local information. In this dissertation, the
differences in information are characterised by the structure of signals on which the
values are assessed. This structure is referred to as the information structure.
Understanding the moral hazard associated with manager behaviour is important
because diffuse security holders are vulnerable to managerial opportunism. This disser-
tation shows that the distortion of information in each labour market creates differences
in the costs of moral hazard, thus influencing differences in structures of executive com-
pensation across countries. The implications that either highly incentivised or fixed
compensation contract designs might be a consequence of strong corporate governance
shed light on heterogenity in moral hazard created by the separation of security owner-
ship and control.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Information structures and managerial incentives
This dissertation addresses the relationship between information and the designs of
managerial incentive contracts across countries. It also aims to better understand the
moral hazard associated with the separation of security ownership and control.
The managerial incentive contract designs differ among countries. Such differences
might reflect the characteristics of various managerial labour markets because these
markets indicate the value of managers as human capital and that can be characterised
by local information. These indications depend, for example, on the success or failure of
the firm or the negotiations with the firm’s stakeholders. The former is an example of
global information and the latter can be an example of either global or local information.
In this dissertation, the differences in information are characterised by the structure of
signals on which the marketable values of managers are assessed. This structure is
referred to as the information structure.
The managerial compensation contract is designed to address moral hazard. Here,
the moral hazard of interest arises when a firm’s decision-making remains the exclusive
province of managers, who are not the firm’s security holders. Understanding such moral
hazard is undoubtedly important. The recognition of this problem, known as moral
hazard, and in this case associated with the separation of security ownership and control,
1
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potentially infinitely impacts financial markets because diffuse security ownership can
potentially infinitely allow for risk sharing.
One challenge to understanding the moral hazard associated with the separation
of security ownership and control is that the classical principal-agent theory fails to
identify risk bearers and contract designers. In the theory, a principal controls an agent’s
unobservable behaviour with the contract that the principal designs. Diffuse security
holders are principals who do not control an agent’s unobservable behaviour with a
contract of their design.
Arguably, such a situation requires a third party dedicated to the task of controlling
moral hazard. In a relationship between firm managers and shareholders, corporate law
attributes this responsibility to the board of directors chosen by shareholders. However,
the board of directors is a principal that does not always act as a residual risk bearer
and a diffuse shareholder’s voting rights are not enough to privately control the third
party. Fama [16] attributed this to the rational expectations of managers created by
competition inside and outside the markets for managers. In other words, managerial
labour markets are viewed as third parties acting as proxies for the security market.
Fama’s ideas were formalised by Holmstro¨m [26] and Gibbons and Murphy [20].1
These studies do not prove the viability of separation of security ownership and control.
However, they open fruitful avenues for a complete understanding of the associated
moral hazard. The studies consider the risk bearer to be a contract designer, but with
the agent perfectly informed of any outside job opportunities. Although unintended, it
is possible to characterise moral hazard as dependent on labour markets as the third
parties, and that observation inspires the current study.
1 Fama’s idea results in building models that correspond closely to efficiency wage models of unem-
ployment. During the late 1970s, economists had been in the search of a coherent explanation as to
why the labour market does not clear when excess supply of labour leads to involuntary unemployment.
Solow [53] provides an explanation for sticky wages with a model in which a labour market is monopo-
listic and an employer has some choice of wages. With an assumption of a competitive labour market,
Calvo [8] and Shapiro and Stiglitz [50] explain involuntary unemployment by introducing a model in
which good workers are paid fixed wages, which are higher than the market clearing price. The latter
model and career concern models, advocated by Fama [16], have common features in their mechanisms
to induce efforts.
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The rise in US executive compensation since 1980s, especially in the form of stock
options, has been controversial. This rise significantly altered the structure of US ex-
ecutive compensation and the relative importance of fixed payments against contingent
payments.2 One concern is that executive pay in the US, which is much higher than that
in other countries, signals the failure of corporate governance, and this possibility has
stimulated considerable empirical3 and theoretical4 research. However, scant attention
has been given to the fact that many cases in other countries are yet to be examined.
This dissertation proposes two possible interpretations of the arguments from the as-
pect of differences in labour markets and their information structures. First, the relative
importance of fixed payments against contingent payments will be robust (fragile) if the
pricing of the market value of human capital of managers is driven by signals of which
contractual provisions are infinitely costly (costless) to enforce. Second, earnings man-
agement, which is often viewed as self-serving behaviour, will not deteriorate shareholder
values if everyone believes that earnings management is undoubtedly present because
contracts are based on signals easily inflated by managers. Such signals make other
signals less effective; consequently, the relative importance of fixed payments against
contingent payments will remain weak.
The relative importance of fixed payments in Japanese firms represents a stark con-
trast to that in US firms. Apparently, the Japanese labour market does not attribute
firm performance to top management to a similar extent as does the US labour market.
This interpretative process accords well with the observation that Japanese management
2Hall and Liebman [23] document that, between 1980 and 1994, the level of CEO compensation
increased by over 200% at the mean and that most of this increase was in the form of stock options.
3Healy [24] postulates that executives rewarded earnings-based bonuses exercise discretion in the
choices of accounting procedures that increase their compensation. Bergstresser and Philippon [5] pro-
vide empirical evidence that firms with CEOs whose overall compensation is more sensitive to the firms’
prices display higher levels of earnings management. Klein [36] documents that firms with audit com-
mittees comprised of less than a majority of independent directors experience higher levels of earnings
management.
4Some theoretical work attributes the increase in CEO compensation to the change in the securities
market. Holmstro¨m and Kaplan [27] argue that the leveraged buyouts takeovers accelerated in early
1980s that were characterised by the heavy use of leverage were associated with significant changes
in corporate governance, including executive compensation. Gabaix and Landier [19] provide a model
in which US CEO compensation is proportional to firm size in market equilibrium, and conclude that
the leap in US CEO compensation is an efficient response to the surge in the market value of firms,
while others attribute this to the change in product market. Cun˜at and Guadalupe [13] investigate the
influence of foreign competition in product markets and document that foreign competition increases
the sensitivity of pay to performance in US CEO compensation.
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seeks broad participation in decision-making and defers final decisions until consensus
is reached among affected managers and departments (see Lincoln et al. [39]).
This dissertation is a step towards a more complete understanding of the moral
hazard created by the separation of security ownership and control.
1.2 Chapter Overviews
This dissertation is comprised of three theoretical models, which are explored in later
chapters. An outline of each model is as follows:
Overview of Chapter 2
The first model, described in Chapter 2, is an N-period optimal compensation model.
The model extends the logic of Gibbons and Murphy [20] by incorporating multi-signals
into their single-signal model. The structure of signals is defined by those on which
contractual provisions are infinitely costless to enforce, that is, contractible signals, and
by those on which contractual provisions are infinitely costly to enforce, that is, non-
contractible signals. The model explains why the structure of executive compensation
varies greatly across countries. Moreover, the model provides a simple counter-example
of the supposition that firms should be transparent to market participants as much as
possible.
In the optimal compensation model, the agent focuses excessively on one signal that
reflects his effort more easily than the other. If a contractible signal is distorted in the
sense that it overstates the constructive outcome provided by the agent, then either
a contractible or a non-contractible signal can be the focal point, and the dichotomy
between contractible and non-contractible signals becomes instrumental in showing the
design for the optimal contract.
The main contribution of Chapter 2 is that the model allows for an explanation of
the cross-country differences in the structure of executive compensation. In a country
observing a large portion of performance pay in executive compensation, the labour
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market mainly attributes firm performance to the top management, and non-contractible
signals receive less attention. A secondary contribution is to find an example that
counters the myth of transparency. An excess of implicit incentives to improve their
marketable value of human capital makes a disincentives contract optimal for managers
with many remaining years of service, and where outcomes may not be improved by
improving transparency via the enforcement of more detailed corporate reporting.
The limits of the model are, first, that the model uses the property of linear functions
that enables a closed-form solution while making something important unobservable.
Second, the model supposes a perfectly competitive labour market which faces obvious
difficulty of explaining why internal labour markets are economically viable. The former
and latter limits are relaxed in the second and third models, respectively.
Overview of Chapter 3
The second model, addressed in Chapter 3, is the single-period optimal compensation
model not restricted to linear functions. The purpose of this generalisation is, first, to
examine the robustness of the findings from the first model in Chapter 2, and second,
to compare the criteria for information systems (performance evaluation systems) in a
standard agency framework with those for information structures in the current study.
As in Chapter 2, a key feature of the model is the dichotomy between contractible and
non-contractible signals.
The model provides a general threshold that indicates whether incentive contracts
will hold their primary condition, wherein a higher signal realisation always implies
a higher reward. Furthermore, Chapter 3 shows that the model’s threshold can be
compared to the criteria for information system rankings in a standard principal-agent
model. The informativeness criterion introduced by Holmstro¨m [25], for example, states
that additional information should be used in contracts until sufficient statistics are
obtained. Chapter 3 demonstrates, however, that this is not the case when considering
a perfectly competitive labour market and non-contractible signals.
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Overview of Chapter 4
The final model, described in Chapter 4, is a two-period optimal compensation model. In
contrast to the aforementioned models, the final model compares the shareholder values5
of two firms whose governance and information structures are entirely different from each
other, and assumes that labour markets are imperfectly competitive. In one firm, any
contingent pay scheme not normally used, along with non-contractible signals, plays an
essential role in the assessment of individual performance. This assessment is subjective
in the sense that the non-contractible signals are only observed in the internal labour
market. Meantime in the other firm, optimal contracts are chosen, but non-contractible
signals are not observed. Consequently, they use only contractible signals for pricing
their managers’ contributions. The comparison indicates a counter-intuitive effect in
which the difference in the information structure can lead the former firm to outperform
the latter one, so long as competition in the labour market is not ignored.
The firms in Chapter 4 illustrate the stylised descriptions of Japanese and US firms.
However, despite its rudimentary model, Chapter 4 may provide some lessons for policy
debates concerning financial regulations aimed at making Japanese firms more trans-
parent: the implementation of performance contingent pay schemes, for example, is not
always beneficial for shareholders under the Japanese systems of governance.
With the above-mentioned three models, this dissertation shows that distortion of
information in each labour market creates differences in the costs of moral hazard, a
factor behind the difference in the structure of executive compensation across countries.
The implications that either highly incentivised or fixed compensation contract designs
might be a consequence of strong corporate governance shed light on heterogenity in
moral hazard created by the separation of security ownership and control.
5The stakeholder values are equally important, but are beyond the scope of Chapter 4 .
Chapter 2
Managerial Incentive Problems:
A Role of Multi-Signals
2.1 Introduction
This chapter provides an executive compensation model and studies the effect of infor-
mation on the cost of moral hazard arising from the relationship between a corporate
executive and his or her shareholders. The information is comprised of contractible and
non-contractible signals, both being imperfectly correlated with the executive’s inputs
(unknown talent and unobservable effort) that cannot be tied with his or her compen-
sation contracts.
The model finds that the distortion of information in each labour market accounts
for a large part of the difference in the structures of executive compensation between
markets. Moreover, the model indicates a policy debate on the role of information in
financial regulations by showing a counter-example for the widespread assumption that
firms should be as transparent as possible to market participants.
In the model, the signal that is more responsive to executive effort than another
signal invites extensive attention. The attracting signal is either contractible or non-
contractible when the executive labour market is competitive. The chapter extends
previous studies (Fama [16]; Holmstro¨m [26]; Gibbons and Murphy [20]; Sabac [47])
7
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by introducing a multi-signal information structure into a reputational principal-agent
relationship in a perfectly competitive labour market. This allows for a direct analysis
of the effect of the information structure on the structures of executive compensation.
The main contribution of this chapter is that the model allows for a simple and in-
tuitive explanation for cross-country differences in the structures of executive compen-
sation. Information structures vary from market to market, shaping different structures
of executive compensation across markets. A larger proportion of performance-related
pay in executive compensation implies that firm performance (contractible) is mainly
attributed to the top manamement, and non-contractible signals receive less attention
in the labour market.
A secondary contribution of this chapter is to address some policy debates concern-
ing the role of information in financial regulations. There is a widespread supposition
that firms should be as transparent as possible to market participants. As a result,
not only financial information (contractible) but also non-financial information (non-
contractible in many cases) is seriously considered as mandated corporate reporting.1
The proposed model allows for evaluating the effect of corporate transparency that plays
a double-edged role. Scholarship on career concerns suggests that increased transparency
is undesirable, first, because more information about the agent’s talent can have a neg-
ative impact on implicit incentives in the form of career concerns (see Holmstro¨m [26];
Cre´mer [12]; Dewatripont et al. [15]), and second, because more information about the
agent’s talent can discourage the agent to use private signals (see Prat [44]). This study
complements these theories by indicating a different rationale for opacity. When implicit
incentives are so strong that the optimal incentive scheme is monotone decreasing, less
noise of information about the agent’s talent and action (providing a positive impact
on implicit incentives) is undesirable because the principal desires to provide the agent
with disincentives.
This chapter is primarily related to the literature on career concerns, with the
main departure addressing the role of multi-signals (a mixture of contractible and non-
contractible signals). The idea that a manager’s concerns about his or her reputation in
1The European Commission proposed disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by large
corporations on April 3, 2013.
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the labour market might solve the problem of moral hazard was first introduced by Fama
[16]. Holmstro¨m [26] provides a simple model to analyse the nature of career concerns,
but the only information he considers is non-contractible outputs. Gibbons and Mur-
phy [20] introduce explicit incentive contracts and manager retirement dates into the
Fama-Holmstrom model, but the only information they consider is contractible outputs.
More recent work considers the role of information. Sabac [47] provides a career concern
model in which outputs are not observable, and therefore, imperfect performance signals
are taken as a proxy, but they are all contractible. Kaarbøe and Olsen’s work [32] is
technically closest to this chapter. They study the role of distorted performance signals
in the presence of career concerns. While they introduce, as this chapter does, a mixture
of contractible and non-contractible signals, they focus on the effect of the distortion of
multi-tasks rather than on multi-signals.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the career
concern model. Section 2.3 studies the role of information in determining compensation
structures. Section 2.4 studies the effect of transparency in the reputational principal-
agent relationship. Section 2.5 provides a conclusion.
2.2 Model
Two-Period Model
Consider a two-period reputational agency model in a competitive labour market, where
the agent with unknown talent2 θ ∼ N(0,σ2θ ) privately takes actions at ∈ A ⊂ R, t =
1, 2. The outcome from the agent’s talent and effort in period t are not observable; hence
they are not contractible.3 Let xt be
xt = θ + bat + τt, t = 1, 2,
2Holmstro¨m [26] assumes that θ is unknown to everybody so that there is symmetric information at
the start of the first period, in order to focus on moral hazard. This study also makes that assumption.
3The principal cannot use the outcome for contracts. This assumption is commonly used in the
literature on performance measures (Holmstro¨m and Milgrom [29]; Feltham and Xie [17]; Kaarbøe and
Olsen [32]; Sabac [47]).
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where b ∈ (0,∞) represents the marginal impact of the agent’s effort on the outcomes
and τt ∼ N(0,σ2τ ) denote a random state of nature.
Observables are a set of signals yt and zt. Let yt and zt be
yt = θ +mat + εt,
zt = θ + pat + νt, t = 1, 2,
where m ∈ (0,∞) and p ∈ (0,∞) denote the marginal impact of the agent’s effort
on the contractible and non-contractible signals, respectively, and εt ∼ N(0,σ2ε) and
νt ∼ N(0,σ2ν) represent errors in assessment of the agent’s performance. Suppose θ, τt,
εt and νt are independent with each other. This chapter assumes that yt are observable
and contractible, and zt are observable but not contractible. Examples of yt are firms’
financial reports or stock price. The market (prospective employers) can offer a contract
which depends on yt. On the other hand, examples of zt are the firm’s policy on envi-
ronmental, social and employee-related matters. Contracts are not contingent on zt, but
the agent makes efforts for raising zt because the public information zt might impinge
his reputation in the labour market. Every participant is risk neutral and an expected
utility maximiser. The agent has the following utility function:
UA = w1 + w2 − c(a1)− c(a2),
where wt denotes the compensation contract offered in period t, c(at) represents the
agent’s private cost in period t. For simplification, this chapter assumes that the optimal
contract is linear and the agent’s private cost is quadratic:
wt(yt) = αt + βtyt, c(at) =
1
2
a2t , t = 1, 2,
where αt,βt ∈ R, t = 1, 2.4
The timing of the two-period model begins when the prospective employers simul-
taneously offer the first-period compensation contract w1. The agent chooses the most
4Justification of the restriction to linear contracts in a similar model can be seen in Holmstro¨m and
Milgrom [28].
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attractive contract and decides the effort level. At the end of the first period, all parties
observe the outcome y1 and the non-contractible measure z1. At the start of the second
period, the firm and the market simultaneously offer the agent w2. The agent is free to
choose the most attractive contract again.
Consider the agent’s choice of the optimal second-period action a2. Given compen-
sation contracts and cost function, the agent’s expected utility is given by
E
[
α1 + β1y1 + α2 + β2y2 − 12a
2
1 −
1
2
a22
]
,
where y1 and z1 are predetermined. The agent’s problem reduces to
max
a2
E[β2y2|y1, z1]− 12a
2
2.
The agent selects
a∗2 = β2m. (2.1)
In the competitive labour market, all the prospective employers are wage takers and
the contract that the agent accepts for the second period must earn zero expected profit.
Thus, α2 is given by
α2(β2) = E {x2|y1, z1}− β2E {y2|y1, z1}
= (1− β2)E[θ|y1, z1] +
( b
m
− β2
)
ma2. (2.2)
A conjecture of a1 is required to determine the agent’s expected talent conditional on
the first-period outcome, E[θ|y1, z1]. Let the conjecture be aˆ1, which is correct in equi-
librium. Applying the well-known formulas for the normal distribution, the agent’s
expected talent conditional on the first-period outcome from the prospective employers’
perspective, µc = E{θ|y1, z1, aˆ1}, is given by
µc = ρy(y1 − E[y1|aˆ1]) + ρz(z1 − E[z1|aˆ1]),
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where
ρy =
σ2θσ
2
ν
σ2θσ
2
ν + σ2εσ
2
θ + σ
2
εσ
2
ν
and ρz =
σ2θσ
2
ε
σ2θσ
2
ν + σ2εσ
2
θ + σ
2
εσ
2
ν
.
The prospective employers compete, resulting in the optimal β2 maximising the
agent’s objective function:
E[w2|y1, z1]− 12a
2
2
and the optimal incentive rate β∗2 is given by
β∗2 =
b
m
. (2.3)
Given the second-period compensation corresponds to the optimal second-period in-
centive β∗2 , the agent’s first period problem to choose a1 reduces to
max
a1
E[β1y1 + α1 + α2]− 12a
2
1,
and the agent’s optimal action is given by
a∗1 = β˜1m+ βzp, (2.4)
where β˜1 = β1 + βy, βy = (1 − β∗2)ρy and βz = (1 − β∗2)ρz . β1m is explicit incentive,
while βym and βzp are implicit incentives that come from the effects of y1 and z1 on
the second-period fixed payment. So far the market’s conjecture about the agent’s first-
period action choice aˆ1 is supposed to be given. In equilibrium, the conjecture which
must be correct is given by
aˆ1 = a
∗
1(β1).
Note that the agent knows that he cannot fool the market in equilibrium. However, he
does not deviate from a∗1(β1) because the deviation works against his reputation. The
logic is that of a signalling game, such as that described by Spence [54]. The equilibrium
concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
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The first period prospective employers’ problem is considered in a manner similar to
the second period. In the competitive labour market, the first-period fixed payment α1
must satisfy
α1(β1) = E[x1]− β1E[y1], (2.5)
and the prospective employers compete, resulting in the optimal effective incentive rate
β˜1 = (β1 + βy)m maximising the agent’s objective function:
E[w1 + w2]− 1
2
a21 −
1
2
a22
and the optimal incentive rate β∗1 is given by
β∗1 =
b
m
− βy − βz p
m
. (2.6)
Characteristics of this two-period model are summarised as follows. First, the ex-
plicit incentive rate is increasing, i.e. β∗1 < β
∗
2 . This result is consistent with Gibbons
and Murphy [20] and generalised in the N-period model. Second, the optimal effective
incentive rate is constant, i.e. β˜1 = β˜2 =
b
m . Third, the first-best action a
∗
1 = a
∗
2 = b
is induced in equilibrium. Finally, bm < 1 must hold in order to examine implicit incen-
tives from career concerns. This performance measure’s scaling distortion is necessary
because this study assumes that the agent is risk neutral and as a result, the first-best
action is induced in equilibrium. Gibbons and Murphy [20] assumed risk aversion so
that optimal contracts do not completely eliminate career concerns. This study assumes
that bm < 1 throughout the rest of this chapter.
N-Period Model
In the N-period model, the agent’s optimal action choice satisfies
a∗t =
∂Et−1
[ N∑
k=t
γk−twk
]
∂at
, (2.7)
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where Et−1[·] = E[·|y1, . . . , yt−1, z1, . . . , zt−1], γ ∈ (0, 1] is the discount rate. When
setting βt, the principal’s problem to induce the optimal period t action is given by
max
βt
Eˆt−1
[ N∑
k=t
γk−t
(
xk − 1
2
a2k
)]
, (2.8)
where Eˆ[·] is the expectation from the perspective of the principal. Note that the above
problem is implicitly incorporates the zero-profit constraint:
Eˆt−1
[ N∑
k=t
wk
]
= Eˆt−1
[ N∑
k=t
xk
]
for t = 1, . . . , N. (2.9)
The following proposition characterises the optimal contract for the N-period model.
Proposition 1. The actions induced by the optimal contract and the optimal incentives
are given by the following recursive relations:
a∗t = b for t = 1, . . . , N, (2.10)
β∗N =
b
m
, (2.11)
β∗t =
b
m
−
N∑
k=t+1
γk−t(1− β∗k)Covk−1
(
yk, zk
)( 1
σ2ε
+
1
σ2ν
p
m
)
(2.12)
for t = 1, . . . , N − 1,
where Covt(·, ·) is the conditional covariance given history (y1, . . . , yt, z1, . . . , zt).
All proofs are in the Appendix.
2.3 Optimal compensation structures
This study addresses the questions on the role of information in optimal compensation
structures. In order to isolate the effects of multi-signal information structures from
those of single-signal ones, this study first derives the properties of the optimal incentives
that hold in both information structures: the optimal incentives are monotonic.
Proposition 2. Suppose bm < 1. The optimal incentive rates exhibit the property:
β∗t < β
∗
t+1 for all t < N .
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Proposition 2 is consistent with the result of Gibbons and Murphy [20]. As men-
tioned in the Introduction, the model of Gibbons and Murphy [20] focuses only on a
contractible signal in each period. Proposition 2 guarantees that the optimal incentives
also exhibit monotonicity in the information structures in which both contractible and
non-contractible signals are observable in each period. The optimal incentives’ mono-
tonicity implies that implicit incentives are a declining sequence because the optimal
effective incentives are constant. The mechanisms causing implicit incentives to dimin-
ish are, first, that the uncertainty over the agent’s talent is eliminated as the conditional
variances, V art−1(θ), converge in the limit to zero, and second, that the agent does not
expect any reputational benefit in the future after the retirement date. These effects
and limits of career concerns are supported by empirical evidence (Gibbons and Murphy
[20]; Chevalier and Ellison [9]).
Here, it is important to consider incentive contracts. What information structure
sustains career concerns incentives for a longer period? In other words, what information
structure reduces the cost of moral hazard? A relevant way to pose the question is to
consider the second term on the right-hand side of (2.12):
βimpt =
N∑
k=t+1
γk−t(1− β∗k)Covk−1
(
yk, zk
)( 1
σ2ε
+
1
σ2ν
p
m
)
, (2.13)
which represents the implicit incentive from career concerns in period t. In other words,
it is a discount rate of the cost of moral hazard. From (2.13), this study notes the
following comparative statics features of the N-period model:
• Suppose the precisions 1
σ2ε
and 1
σ2ν
are fixed; then, βimpt is increasing in Covk−1(yk, zk)
for k ≥ t+ 1.
• βimpt is increasing in pm .
The interpretation given to Covk−1(yk, zk) was the conditional covariance of financial
reports yk and non-financial reports zk, given the history of reports, y1, . . . , yk−1 and
z1, . . . , zk−1; hence this result implies that if both financial and non-financial reports
are required, and if they will significantly correlate, then implicit incentives from career
concerns are sustained for a longer period. One of factors that makes the conditional
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covariance Covk−1(yk, zk) higher is the opaque information about the agent’s talent θ.
More precisely,
• Covk−1(yk, zk) is decreasing in 1σ2θ .
More interesting is the comparative statics βimpt with respect to
p
m . Variables p andm
represent the marginal impact of effort on the non-contractible and contractible signals,
respectively. A larger pm implies that the non-contractible signals are more responsive to
efforts than the contractible signals. Such an information structure sustains the career
concerns effect for a longer period. Conversely, the lower pm diminishes career concerns
at an earlier period.
Figure 2.1 illustrates this comparative statics effect. The fact is that the longer that
career concerns are sustained, the deeper the drop of optimal incentives in early years.
This can be detrimental in practice, because arguably, the optimal incentives should be
positive. This issue is discussed further in the next section.
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Figure 2.1: Optimal explicit incentives: N = 15, γ = 0.95, b
m
= 0.5, σ2ε = σ
2
ν = σ
2
θ .
2.4 Transparency
This study now turns to another set of questions regarding comparative statics and ex-
amines some implications on the role of information transparency in influencing optimal
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incentives. In addressing this issue, this study hopes to highlight the importance of pre-
venting the optimal incentives from becoming negative. As mentioned in Section 2.3, if
the optimal incentives must be positive, then firms cannot make managers stop working
hard in the early years. This is a detriment that is difficult to control, and leads to a
comparison between optimal incentives and the accuracy of information. From (2.12),
the following comparative statics features are obtained.
Lemma 1.
• If pm ≤ 1, then β∗t is decreasing in 1σ2ε .
• If pm ≥ 1, then β∗t is decreasing in 1σ2ν .
The interpritation is that if financial reports are more (less) responsive to effort than
non-financial reports, then the more accurate are financial (non-financial) reports, the
larger negative are the optimal incentives in early years. In other words, information that
is relatively responsive to effort should be opaque when firms assign tasks to managers
who have many remaining years.
2.5 Conclusion
Moral hazard problems created by the separation of security ownership and control have
played an influential role in shaping the debate over accounting abuses. Simultaneously,
however, our understanding of moral hazard in other words, that of the problem of
managerial incentives is far from clear. It would be wrong to generate too simplistic
a conclusion about the provision of incentives. However, to the extent that career
motives can be considered, this study suggests that the information in which a mixture
of contractible and non-contractible signals is observable can provide counter-intuitive
effects. It may open new avenues for empirical research. For instance, in the area
of cross-country differences in the extent of pay-for-performance for top management,
this study implies that it is important to consider what information can be attributed
to executives other than firm performance. The extent to which the labour market
attributes firm performance to top management depends on the degree to which the
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managers have power over the firm’s decisions, and that degree varies greatly across
countries.
Despite the limitations of the model, however, this study may provide some implica-
tions for the debates on financial regulations. A striking result is an example, furnished
by the theory, to counter the myth that firms should be as transparent as possible to
market participants. After all, the normative implication provides a lesson: placing all
emphasis on the shareholders’ perspective does not always lead to efficiency. Opaque
information may be preferable for both shareholders and managers who have many re-
maining years.
Appendix
To keep the notation simple, let δt = θ + εt, ηt = θ + νt and κt = θ + τt. Let H
y
kt and
Hzkt be the impact of observed contractible and non-contractible signal history at date
t on conditional expectations of period k contractible signal with components Hykt =
(Hy1kt , . . . ,H
yt
kt) and H
z
kt = (H
z1
kt , . . . ,H
zt
kt), respectively, i.e. Et[δk] = H
y
kt(δ1, . . . , δt)
T +
Hzkt(η1, . . . , ηt)
T . Similarly, Let Lykt and L
z
kt be the impact of observed contractible
and non-contractible signal history at date t on conditional expectations of period k
outcome with components Lykt = (L
y1
kt , . . . , L
yt
kt) and L
z
kt = (L
z1
kt , . . . , L
zt
kt), respectively,
i.e. Et[κk] = L
y
kt(δ1, . . . , δt)
T +Lzkt(η1, . . . , ηt)
T . Note that Hykt = L
y
kt and H
z
kt = L
z
kt for
all k and t. Thus, only Hykt and H
z
kt are used in the proof of Proposition 1.
The following lemma is a special case of Lemma 1 of Sabac [47] and is used in the
proof of Proposition 1.
Lemma 1. If the contract wt satisfies the participation constraint in (2.9), then
wt = Eˆt−1[xt] + βt(yt − Eˆt−1[yt]). (2.14)
The proof can be seen in Sabac [47].
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Proof of Proposition 1.
Consider the agent’s optimal action a∗t for period t. Substituting (2.14) in Lemma 1 into
(2.7), a∗t can be rewritten as
a∗t =
∂Et−1
[
N∑
k=t
γk−t
(
Eˆt−1[xt] + βt(yt − Eˆt−1[yt])
)]
∂at
,
and one obtains the following equation:
a∗t =
N∑
k=t
γk−t(1− βk)
(
Hytk k−1m+H
zt
k k−1p
)
+mβt.
Substituting the above equation into (2.8), the optimal incentives are given by
β∗t =
b
m
−
N∑
k=t+1
γk−t(1− βk)
(
Hytk k−1 +H
zt
k k−1
p
m
)
. (2.15)
Now it is shown that for k ≥ 2,
Ek−1[δk] =
σ2θσ
2
ν
(k − 1)σ2θ(σ2ν + σ2ε) + σ2εσ2ν
(δ1 + · · ·+ δk−1)
+
σ2θσ
2
ε
(k − 1)σ2θ(σ2ν + σ2ε) + σ2εσ2ν
(η1 + · · ·+ ηk−1). (2.16)
Note that (2.16) determines for 1 ≤ t ≤ k − 1,
Hytk k−1 =
σ2θσ
2
ν
(k − 1)σ2θ(σ2ν + σ2ε) + σ2εσ2ν
and Hztk k−1 =
σ2θσ
2
ε
(k − 1)σ2θ(σ2ν + σ2ε) + σ2εσ2ν
.
The proof is by induction on k. Let ζk be the normalised random variable:
ζk =


δk−Ek−1[δk]√
V ark−1(δk)
1√
1−ρ2
(
ηk−Ek−1[ηk]√
V ark−1(ηk)
− ρ δk−Ek−1[δk]√
V ark−1(δk)
)

 ,
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where ρ = Cov(δk−Ek−1[δk],ηk−Ek−1[ηk])√
V ar(δk−Ek−1[δk])V ar(ηk−Ek−1[ηk])
. Since ζk is independent of δ1, . . . , δk−1, the
conditional expectation of δk+1 can be written as
Ek[δk+1] = Ek−1[δk+1] + Cov(δk+1, ζk)ζk
= Ek−1[δk] + Cov(δk+1, ζk)ζk. (2.17)
For k = 2, (2.16) follows from
E1[δ2] =
σ2θσ
2
ν
σ2θσ
2
ν + σ
2
θσ
2
ε + σ
2
εσ
2
ν
δ1 +
σ2θσ
2
ε
σ2θσ
2
ν + σ
2
θσ
2
ε + σ
2
εσ
2
ν
η1.
Suppose that (2.16) holds for k. Then,
δk − Ek−1[δk] = θ + εk − σ
2
θσ
2
ν
(k − 1)σ2θ(σ2ν + σ2ε) + σ2εσ2ν
(
(k − 1)θ + ε1 + · · ·+ εk−1
)
− σ
2
θσ
2
ε
(k − 1)σ2θ (σ2ν + σ2ε) + σ2εσ2ν
(
(k − 1)θ + ν1 + · · · + νk−1
)
.
(2.18)
From (2.17), it follows that
Ek[δk+1] = Ek−1[δk] + Cov(δk+1, ζk)ζk
= Ek−1[δk] +
σ2θσ
2
ν
kσ2θ(σ
2
ν + σ2ε) + σ2εσ2ν
(δk − Ek−1[δk])
+
σ2θσ
2
ε
kσ2θ(σ
2
ν + σ
2
ε) + σ
2
εσ
2
ν
(ηk −Ek−1[ηk])
=
σ2θσ
2
ν
kσ2θ(σ
2
ν + σ
2
ε) + σ
2
εσ
2
ν
(δ1 + · · ·+ δk)
+
σ2θσ
2
ε
kσ2θ(σ
2
ν + σ2ε) + σ2εσ2ν
(η1 + · · ·+ ηk).
The last equation is because Ek−1[δk] = Ek−1[ηk]. This proves the induction hypothesis
(2.16). Thus, β∗t in (2.15) is given by
β∗t =
b
m
−
N∑
k=t+1
γk−t(1− β∗k)Cov(δk − Ek−1[δk], ηk − Ek−1[ηk])
(
1
σ2ε
+
1
σ2ν
p
m
)
. (2.19)
The last equation proves (2.12) in Proposition 1.
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Considering the participation constraint in (2.9), the agent’s optimal action in (2.7)
can be rewritten as
a∗t =
∂Et−1
[ N∑
k=t
γk−txk
]
∂at
,
and this proves (2.10) in Proposition 1 and completes the proof of Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 2.
It is shown that for k = 1, . . . , N − 1,
β∗N−k ≤ β∗N−k+1 − γk(1−
b
m
)
σ2θσ
2
ν + σ
2
θσ
2
ε
p
m
(N − 1)σ2θ (σ2ε + σ2ν) + σ2εσ2ν
. (2.20)
The proof is by induction on k. For k = 1, from (2.19) one obtains
β∗N−1 = β
∗
N − γ(1−
b
m
)
σ2θσ
2
ν + σ
2
θσ
2
ε
p
m
(N − 1)σ2θ(σ2ε + σ2ν) + σ2εσ2ν
.
Suppose the induction hypothesis (2.20) holds for k − 1. From (2.19), β∗N−k is given by
β∗N−k =
b
m
− γk(1 − β∗N )
σ2θσ
2
ν + σ
2
θσ
2
ε
p
m
(N − 1)σ2θ(σ2ε + σ2ν) + σ2εσ2ν
−
N−1∑
i=N−k+1
γi−(N−k)(1− β∗i )
σ2θσ
2
ν + σ
2
θσ
2
ε
p
m
(i− 1)σ2θ (σ2ε + σ2ν) + σ2εσ2ν
.
Let Ai = −(1 − β∗i ) σ
2
θσ
2
ν+σ
2
θσ
2
ε
p
m
(i−1)σ2θ (σ
2
ε+σ
2
ν)+σ
2
εσ
2
ν
. Ai < Ai+1 holds for i = N − k + 1, . . . , N − 1,
one obtains
βN−k =
b
m
− γk(1− β∗N )
σ2θσ
2
ν + σ
2
θσ
2
ε
p
m
(N − 1)σ2θ(σ2ε + σ2ν) + σ2εσ2ν
+
N−1∑
i=N−k+1
γi−(N−k)Ai
<
b
m
− γk(1− β∗N )
σ2θσ
2
ν + σ
2
θσ
2
ε
p
m
(N − 1)σ2θ(σ2ε + σ2ν) + σ2εσ2ν
+
N∑
i=N−k+2
γi−(N−k+1)Ai
= β∗N−k+1 − γk(1− β∗N )
σ2θσ
2
ν + σ
2
θσ
2
ε
p
m
(N − 1)σ2θ (σ2ε + σ2ν) + σ2εσ2ν
.
Hence, (2.20) holds for k = 1, . . . , N − 1. Since bm < 1 from the assumption, this proves
Proposition 2.
Chapter 3
Moral hazard and preference for
fixed payments
3.1 Introduction
In a principal-agent relationship after contracting, hidden action and hidden information
play a major role in causing moral hazard, while opaque information about an agent’s
unknown talent can be an important factor in the reduction of moral hazard, if one con-
siders the effects of career concerns, wherein, for example, an agent works hard without
any incentive scheme, anticipating better job opportunities in the future. However, these
effects have received scant attention from studies on the ranking of information systems
for designing contracts. This chapter proposes a model in which there are principal-
agent (incentive) problems and in which a principal can contextualise an agent’s career
concerns in a general distribution formulation, so as to examine the role of information
structure in a manner parallel to prior work on the ranking of information systems.
In the model, the agent has unknown talent and privately takes an action. His hidden
talent and action are learned through two imperfect, mutually observable signals: one
is contractible and the other is non-contractible. The competitive labour market prices
the value of the agent’s human capital accordingly. Among them, the contractible signal
can also be used for designing incentive schemes by prospective employers in the market.
22
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The model provides a general threshold level of information structure, where the
optimal incentive scheme always violates the condition for it to be non-decreasing, that is,
a higher contractible signal realisation may not always imply higher compensation. The
threshold indicates that even when incentive schemes are monotone non-decreasing in the
contractible signal in a standard principal-agent model, it can be monotone decreasing in
this model. Moreover, this chapter finds that Kim’s [35] mean preserving spread (MPS)
criterion, which is used for ranking information systems in terms of relative efficiency in
a standard principal-agent model, can be applied to testing the monotonicity of incentive
schemes in this model; however, this is only valid for a subclass of information structures
that this chapter considers.
In this general distribution formulation, the conditional probability density function
of the contractible signal, given the observed non-contractible signal, does not always
hold the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP) the property wherein higher
signals represent good news, even though each signal individually holds the property
and tells whether the optimal incentive scheme, on the basis of the contractible signal,
can be monotone non-decreasing. The chapter generalises Gibbons and Murphy [20]
and extends Dewatripont et al. [15] by drawing a general form of an agent’s marginal
implicit incentives from Dewatripont et al. [15] and building a principal’s problem in the
context of Gibbons and Murphy [20].
The central inequation in this chapter (inequation (3.8), the threshold mentioned
above) is expressed in a comparison of covariances of each signal’s likelihood ratio and the
agent’s output. The expression allows us to solve for the relationship with Kim’s MPS
criterion. Considering that the non-contractible signal is a candidate for observables
used for designing an incentive scheme, if the information system of a non-contractible
signal is more efficient than that of a contractible signal (in the sense of Kim’s MPS
criterion), then the optimal incentive scheme cannot be monotone non-decreasing. This
condition is sufficient but not necessary for the central inequation in this chapter, which
also implies that an efficient information system in a standard principal-agent model can
violate the conditions for the incentive scheme to be progressive in this model.
It is important to explain how this chapter relates to prior work. This chapter is
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based on Gibbons and Murphy [20] in spirit. Just as Gibbons and Murphy [20] consider
incentive schemes and career concern effects concurrently in a normal distribution for-
mulation, this model represents a hybrid of those considerations in a general distribution
formulation.1 Implicit incentives that an agent makes efforts without formal incentive
schemes were first recognised by Fama [16], formalised by Holmstro¨m [26] and gener-
alised by Dewatripont et al. [15]. Dewatripont et al. [15] demonstrate that information
structures on career concerns can be analogously compared to the rankings of informa-
tion systems in a standard principal-agent model. The present study begins by mixing
general career concerns, principal-agent problems and a first-order approach to solving
the problems.
The subject of ranking information systems was first addressed by Blackwell [6]. It
was introduced as a decision-maker’s (statistician) ranking of experiments (sampling
procedures). Gjesdal [21] analyses it as a problem of information system choice in a
principal-agent problem. He shows that Blackwell’s ranking is sufficient but not neces-
sary for many principal-agent problems.2 Holmstro¨m [25] independently proposes the
informativeness criterion, which plays a leading part in information system rankings for a
principal-agent problem. In essence, the informativeness criterion means that additional
information should be used for designing incentive schemes until sufficient statistics
are obtained, because at this point, further information does not add any news that
will affect the agent’s action. More recently, introducing his MPS criterion, Kim [35]
has extended Holmsto¨m’s informativeness criterion, which supposes inclusive informa-
tion systems3 by also making it available for ranking noninclusive information systems.4
This chapter offers new insights into the literature by showing that non-contractible
information might invalidate the ranking of information systems on the basis of prior
work.
1Gibbons and Murphy [20] first show how incentive contracts are influenced by career concerns using
the Normal-Exponential (CARA-Gaussian) model restricting linear contracts. The CARA Gaussian
model, which considers both incentive contracts and career concerns, is utilised in Meyer and Vickers
[41], Kaarbøe and Olsen [32], Sabac [46, 47] and Ogaku [43].
2 Gjesdal [21] shows that Blackwell’s ranking might be invalid when the agent’s risk preferences
depend on his actions.
3Inclusive information systems can be described as a vector x and a subvector T (x), which are
obtained by deleting some components of x.
4Kim [35] proves that Holmstro¨m’s informativeness criterion and the MPS criterion are equivalent
when the ranking is conducted between inclusive information systems.
Chapter 3. Moral hazard and preference for fixed payments 25
Sufficient conditions for the incentive schemes to be non-decreasing have been in-
vestigated intensively in a standard principal-agent paradigm Grossman and Hart [22];
Rogerson [45]; Sinclair-Desgagne´ [52]). Grossman and Hart [22] and Rogerson [45] show
that if MLRP and concavity of distribution function condition (CDFC) hold, then a
second-best optimal incentive scheme satisfies the monotonicity constraint when the
signal space is one dimensional. With regard to that condition in a multidimensional
signal space, Sinclair-Desgagne´ [52] confirm that MLRP and generalised CDFE in multi-
dimensional space are sufficient conditions. This chapter assumes MLRP but not CDFC;
however, what makes the monotonicity invalid is non-contractible information’s relative
efficiency in developing a reputation in the market.
The basic model is advanced in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 presents the threshold for
incentive schemes violating non-decreasing monotonicity. Section 3.4 shows how the cen-
tral inequation (3.8) relates to Kim’s MPS criterion. Section 3.5 provides a conclusion.
3.2 Basic Model
Consider a single-period principal-agent relationship in the competitive labour market,
where a risk-averse agent with unknown talent θ ∈ R privately takes an action a ∈ A =
[0, a¯]. The agent’s talent and action will be learned by a set of variables x = (y, z) ∈
X ⊂ R2, which becomes commonly observable without cost. This chapter assumes that
y is contractible, while z is not. Supposing the agent is a firm manager, examples of y
are the firm’s earnings and share prices. Thus, the market (prospective employers) can
design the agent’s incentive scheme, s, as a function of y. On the other hand, examples
of z are things that are (infinitely) costly to enforce in those contractual provisions:
non-financial information on social, environmental and employee matters of the firm;
press reports on leadership; and the initiative or charisma of the manager, for example.
The agent is induced to raise the non-contractible signal z as well as the contractible
signal y by assuming that he cares about his reputation in the market. Let the reputation
be represented by the market’s equilibrium expectation of the agent’s talent after he/she
Chapter 3. Moral hazard and preference for fixed payments 26
observes the full statistic x = (y, z). Let a∗ ∈ A be an equilibrium action, then the
reputation is written as t = E[θ|x, a∗].
The information structure is represented by a density function f(θ, x|a), parametrised
by the agent’s action. The problem is whether the incentive scheme s defined in the
information structure f is monotone non-decreasing.
The analysis begins by imposing the following assumptions.
Assumption 1: The agent has the following utility function:
U(w) − V (a), U ′ > 0, U ′′ < 0, V ′ > 0, V ′′ > 0,
where w = s + t is the aggregation of the incentive scheme s and the reputation t, and
V denotes a measure of the agent’s disutility of effort.
Assumption 2: f(θ, x|a) is positive and twice continuously differentiable, and respec-
tive marginal densities are
h(y, θ|a) =
∫
f(θ, x|a)dz,
l(z, θ|a) =
∫
f(θ, x|a)dy,
fˆ(x|a) =
∫
f(x, θ|a)dθ,
hˆ(y|a) =
∫
fˆ(x|a)dz, and
lˆ(z|a) =
∫
fˆ(x|a)dy,
where h, l, hˆ and lˆ are strict MLRP.
Assumption 3: The reputation t(x) = E[θ|x, a∗] is additively separable in y and z, i.e.
t(x) = A(y) +B(z), and strictly increasing in y and z.5 Let s˜(y) = s(y) +A(y).
5Some examples of random variables that satisfy Assumption 3 are as follows. Suppose θ, y and z
are all normally distributed. Then, t(x) is a linear function of y and z. Suppose y and z are positively
correlated with θ. Then, t(x) is strictly increasing in y and z.
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Note that s˜(y) in Assumption 3 is the agent’s overall reward from the contractible
variable y and is used in the prospective employers’ problem explained below because
the prospective employers cannot control the non-contractible signal z by definition.
In the competitive labour market, the prospective employers are supposed to be wage
takers, i.e. they compete, resulting in the optimal reward s˜(y) maximising the agent’s
expected utility. The optimal s˜ is a solution of the problem:
max
s˜,a
∫
(U(w) − V (a)) fˆ(x|a)dx (3.1)
subject to
∫ (
y +
∫
θ
f(x, θ|a∗)
fˆ(x|a∗) dθ − w
)
fˆ(x|a)dx = 0 and (3.2)
and
∫
U(w)fˆadx = V
′(a), (3.3)
where (3.2) reflects the restriction that the contract must earn zero expected profit for the
principal. In other words, this is the participation constraint for the agent; the principal
must offer the agent the expected reward w at least as high as the agent’s expected
outcome y and talent t = E[θ|x, a∗] = ∫ θ f(x,θ|a∗)
fˆ(x|a∗)
dθ. Also, (3.3) represents the incentive
constraint. Let the agent’s expected utility M(a) ≡ ∫ (U(w)− V (a)) fˆ(x|a)dx. Here,
(3.3) is a relaxed constraint of a ∈ argmax
aˆ∈A
M(aˆ), and this approach is called the first-
order approach.6 Also, (3.3) represents a stationary point for the agent, i.e. M ′(a) = 0.
In order to guarantee that the point be the agent’s optimal action choice, it is supposed
that M(a) is strictly concave, i.e. M ′′(a) < 0 for all a ∈ A. Consider the Lagrangian
form obtained by assigning undetermined multipliers λ and µ to (3.2) and (3.3):
L(s˜, a) =
∫
(U(w)− V (a)) fˆ(x|a)dx
+ λ
∫ (
y +
∫
θ
f(x, θ|a∗)
fˆ(x|a∗) dθ − w
)
fˆ(x|a)dx + µ
(∫
U(w)fˆadx− V ′(a)
)
.
6Grossman and Hart [22], Rogerson [45] and Sinclair-Desgagne´ [52] show that MLRP and CDFC are
sufficient for the validity of the first-order approach.
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Differentiating with respect to the scalar a and the function w,7 one obtains the first-
order conditions as follows:
∂L
∂a
=M ′(a) + λ
∫ (
y +
∫
θ
f(x, θ|a∗)
fˆ(x|a∗) dθ − w
)
fˆa(x|a)dx+ µM ′′(a) = 0,
i.e.
µ = −λM ′′(a)−1
∫ (
y +
∫
θ
f(x, θ|a∗)
fˆ(x|a∗) dθ − w
)
fˆa(x|a)dx, (3.4)
and
∂L
∂s˜
= U ′(w)fˆ − λfˆ + µU ′(w)fˆa = 0,
i.e.
λ
U ′(w)
=
(
1 + µ
fˆa
fˆ
)
. (3.5)
Substituting the equilibrium effort a = a∗, µ in (3.4) can be written as
µ = −λM ′′(a∗)−1
(
cov(y,
hˆa
hˆ
)− cov(s(y), hˆa
hˆ
)
)
. (3.6)
3.3 Monotonicity of optimal incentive schemes
Let sf (y) be the optimal incentive scheme that depends on the information structure f
and satisfies (3.4) and (3.5).
Observation 1. If µ > 0 and ∂∂y
(
fˆa
fˆ
)
≥ 0, then
wy ≥ 0 ∀y
and the equation is satisfied only if ∂∂y
(
fˆa
fˆ
)
= 0 is satisfied.
7A variation method is used with regard to w.
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Proof. Differentiating (3.5) with respect to y, one obtains the following.
−λ U
′′
(U ′)2
wy = µ
∂
∂y
(
fˆa
fˆ
)
. (3.7)
Let the first-best reward when the agent’s incentive constraint in (3.3) is not considered
be wλ. wλ must satisfy λ = U ′(wλ). Since U ′ > 0 from Assumption 1, λ > 0 must be
satisfied. With Assumption 1, Assumption 2 and λ > 0, (3.7) implies wy ≥ 0 and the
equation is satisfied only if ∂∂y
(
fˆa
fˆ
)
= 0 is satisfied.
Proposition 1. Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then, any µ satisfying (3.3) and (3.5) is
positive.
The proof is in the Appendix.
Observation 1 and Proposition 1 immediately provide the following corollary.
Corollary 1. sf (y) violates non-decreasing monotonicity if the contractible signal y is
noninformative in the sense of Holmstro¨m [25], i.e. there exists function m : X → R
such that for all (z, a), the density fˆ can be factorised according to
fˆ(x|a) = m(y, z)lˆ(z|a).
Proof. The equality
fˆ(x|a) = m(y, z)lˆ(z|a)
implies
fˆa
fˆ
=
lˆa
lˆ
.
Thus, one has
∂
∂y
(
fˆa
fˆ
)
= 0.
From the above equation, Observation 1 and Proposition 1, one has wy = 0. From
Assumption 3, sf (y)′ < 0 is implied.
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The proof of Corollary 1 demonstrates that Holmstro¨m’s [25] informativeness crite-
rion does not consider the case of wy < 0. That is, an additional signal y is informative
as long as it conveys information about an optimal reward/penalty on the basis of y.
Thus, the converse of Corollary 1 is false.
Corollary 1 is straightforward: when contractible signals are uninformative, their
information systems do not hold a condition in which the incentive schemes are non-
decreasing. The following proposition provides the threshold that sf (y) fails to hold
non-decreasing monotonicity.
Proposition 2. sf (y) violates non-decreasing monotonicity if
cov(
lˆa
lˆ
, y) ≥ cov( hˆa
hˆ
, y). (3.8)
The proof is in the Appendix.
Corollary 2. The converse of Proposition 2 is false.
Proof. Suppose wy = 0. Then sf (y)′ =
∂
∂yE[θ|x, a∗]. From Assumption 3, sf (y)′ >
0.
The central inequation (3.8) means that the conditional probability density function
of the contractible signal y, given the observed non-contractible signal z, does not hold
the MLRP, although the probability density function of y, hˆ, independently holds the
property. In other words, this applies when y is good news about the agent’s effort but
bad news if z is observed beforehand. The central inequation (3.8) can be used for testing
whether the incentive schemes of information systems can be monotone non-decreasing,
that is, whether fixed payments are preferable.
Example 1. Let signals be
y = θ + pa+ ε, y ∼ N(θ¯ + pa,σ2θ + σ2ε), p ∈ (0, 1)
z = θ + a+ ν, z ∼ N(θ¯ + a,σ2θ + σ2ν).
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Then, covariances are given by
cov
(
lˆa(z|aˆ)
lˆ(z|aˆ) , y
)
=
σ2θ
σ2θ + σ
2
ν
cov
(
y,
hˆa(y|aˆ)
hˆ(y|aˆ)
)
= p,
and wy is given by
wy =
cov
(
y, hˆa(y|aˆ)
hˆ(y|aˆ)
)− cov( lˆa(z|aˆ)
lˆ(z|aˆ)
, y
)
V ar(y|z, a) .
The sign of wy can be positive and negative depending on the covariance relation of
likelihood ratios. The fact that normal distributions do not obey CDFC implies that
the monotonicity of incentive schemes in this model is independent of CDFC.
The central inequation in (3.8) in Example 1 is written as
p ≤ σ
2
θ
σ2θ + σ
2
ν
(< 1),
where p denotes the marginal impact of the agent’s action on y, σ2θ is the variance of the
agent’s talent and σ2ν is the variance of z’s noise term. It implies that (3.8) holds when
z is more responsive to the agent’s action than y, i.e. 1 > p, and both signals convey
opaque information about the agent’s talent, but z’s noise term is small.
3.4 Relationship with MPS Criterion
Next, this section shows how the central inequation in (3.8) relates to Kim’s MPS
criterion. For completeness, this section restates Kim’s result:
MPS Criterion: Assuming that the first-order approach is valid,8 the information
system lˆ is more efficient than hˆ at a = aˆ if the random variable lˆa(z|aˆ)
lˆ(z|aˆ)
is a mean
8This section interprets the assumption of the validity of the first-order approach as the validity in
terms of lˆ and hˆ, separately.
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preserving spread of hˆa(y|aˆ)
hˆ(y|aˆ)
. That is,
∫ y
Lal (t)dt ≥
∫ y
Lah(t)dt for all y ∈ R (3.9)
with the strict inequality holding for some range of y ∈ R with positive measure, where
Lal and L
a
h are the cumulative distribution function of
lˆa(z|aˆ)
lˆ(z|aˆ)
and hˆa(y|aˆ)
hˆ(y|aˆ)
, respectively.
Interestingly, (3.9) implies that {hah , lal } can be seen as a martingale. This section
refers to a purely technical result from the literature on stochastic orders.
Lemma 1. [Shaked and Shanthikumar [49], Theorem 3.A.1 and Theorem 3.A.4]
(3.9) holds⇔ hˆa(y|aˆ)
hˆ(y|aˆ) ≤cx
lˆa(z|aˆ)
lˆ(z|aˆ) ⇒
{
hˆa(y|aˆ)
hˆ(y|aˆ) ,
lˆa(z|aˆ)
lˆ(z|aˆ)
}
is a martingale,
that is
hˆa(y|aˆ)
hˆ(y|aˆ) = E
[
lˆa(z|aˆ)
lˆ(z|aˆ)
∣∣∣∣y
]
. (3.10)
Proof of Lemma 1 is found in Shaked and Shanthikumar [49].9
Kim’s MPS criterion is originally used for ranking information systems for incentive
schemes, and lˆ is the probability density function of the non-contractible signal z, but
following corollary temporally considers lˆ as if a candidate of information systems for
incentive schemes, in order to compare lˆ and hˆ in terms of their relative efficiency in
overall incentive problems.
Corollary 3. If information system lˆ is more efficient than hˆ in the sense of Kim’s MPS
criterion, then sf (y) violates non-decreasing monotonicity.
9Dewatripont et al. [15] and Shaked and Shanthikumar [49] document that the MPS criterion is
necessary and sufficient for the martingale property. This section uses only the sufficiency condition.
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Proof.
cov
(
lˆa(z|aˆ)
lˆ(z|aˆ) , y
)
=
∫ ∫
y
lˆa(z|aˆ)
lˆ(z|aˆ) f(y, z)dydz
=
∫ ∫
y
lˆa(z|aˆ)
lˆ(z|aˆ) k(z|y)h(y)dydz
=
∫
yh(y)
∫
lˆa(z|aˆ)
lˆ(z|aˆ) k(z|y)dzdy
= cov
(
y,E
[
lˆa(z|aˆ)
lˆ(z|aˆ)
∣∣∣∣y
])
= cov
(
y,
hˆa(y|aˆ)
hˆ(y|aˆ)
)
(∵ Lemma 1.)
From Proposition 2, sf (y) violates non-decreasing monotonicity.
Corollary 4. The converse of Corollary 3 is false.
Proof. Suppose cov
(
y, lˆa(z|aˆ)
lˆ(z|aˆ)
)
> cov
(
y, hˆa(y|aˆ)
hˆ(y|aˆ)
)
. From the proof of Corollary 3, it
implies information system lˆ is not more efficient than hˆ in the sense of MPS criterion.
In words, Corollary 3 and 4 indicate that Kim’s MPS criterion is sufficient but not
necessary for the central inequation in (3.8). This implies that if there exists lˆ that is
more efficient than hˆ, hˆ can no longer be an information system that holds a primary
condition in which incentive schemes are monotone non-decreasing. Moreover, even if
hˆ is more efficient than lˆ in Kim’s MPS criterion, hˆ is not an information system that
holds the incentive scheme’s non-decreasing monotonicity when (3.8) holds.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter has shown that efficient information systems can fail to hold their primary
condition in which incentive schemes are monotone non-decreasing in a principal-agent
relationship, considering the assistance of a labour market. Because the agent will devote
himself to raising one signal that is more responsive to his action than the other, if the
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non-contractible signal excessively invites the agent’s attention, then optimal incentive
schemes, on the basis of the contractible signal, are not monotone non-decreasing.
One important implication from this chapter is that the efficiency of an informa-
tion system may depend on non-contractible signals. In extreme circumstances, non-
contractible signals might invalidate rankings of information systems for a standard
agency paradigm.
The principal-agent theory has been developed by departing from theories of mar-
ket forces. More recent work, however, handles a situation in which both incentive
problems and market forces are considered. This chapter provides new insight into the
literature on ranking information systems in a principal-agent model and shows that
such hybridisation opens up new avenues for the research on moral hazard.
For brevity, this chapter has restricted the above analysis to the case where each
signal (contractible and non-contractible) is defined in terms of scalar random variables
satisfying MLRP. However, this chapter’s results can be generalised so as to consider
situations in which vector random variables are suitable.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
Proof. The proof is similar to Lemma 1 of Jewitt [30]. Substituting (3.5) into (3.3), one
obtains
∫
U(w)
( λ
U ′(w)
− 1
)
fˆ dx = µV ′(a). (3.11)
Using the fact that E
[
fˆa
fˆ
]
= 0, (3.5) gives
E
[ λ
U ′(w)
]
= 1. (3.12)
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(3.12) implies that the covariance of U(w) and λU ′(w) is equal to µV
′(a). Since one knows
that λ > 0 from (3.5), U(w) and λU ′(w) are monotone increasing and their covariance is
positive. Since V ′(a) is positive, one knows that µ > 0.
Proof of Proposition 2.
Proof. fˆ(x|a) can be rewritten as
fˆ(x|a) = m(y|z, a)lˆ(z|a),
= k(z|y, a)hˆ(y|a),
where m(y|z, a) is a density function of y conditioned by (z, a), and k(z|y, a) is a density
function of z conditioned by (y, a). Since
∂
∂y
(
fˆa
fˆ
)
=
∂
∂y
(ma
m
)
,
and from Observation 1 and Proposition 1 one knows that ∂∂y
(
ma
m
)
and wy are of the
same sign. mam can be written as
ma
m
=
ka
k
+
hˆa
hˆ
− lˆa
lˆ
.
Note that cov(kak , y) = 0. Thus,
cov(
ma
m
, y) = cov(
hˆa
hˆ
, y)− cov( lˆa
lˆ
, y).
If cov( lˆa
lˆ
, y) ≥ cov( hˆa
hˆ
, y) holds, the above equation tells that mam is negatively corre-
lated with y and ∂∂y
(
ma
m
)
> 0 have to be denied. Hence, sf (y) violates non-decreasing
monotonicity.
Chapter 4
Would Shareholders in Firms
with Japanese Governance
Mechanisms Benefit from the Use
of Annual Incentive Plans?
The recent dismissal of the British chief executive of Olympus has once again drawn
the attention of European media to peculiarities in corporate governance in Japan.
Accounting practices and lack of transparency have aroused particular concern.
(Cortazzi [11], pg. 15)
4.1 Introduction
This chapter studies the economic consequences of the choice of two different types
of executive compensation contracts and examines whether shareholders in firms with
Japanese governance mechanisms would benefit from the use of annual incentive plans.
This article is based on my paper, Ogaku [42], “Would shareholders in firms with Japanese gover-
nance mechanisms benefit from the use of annual incentive plans,” Journal of Management Accounting,
Japan, Supplement 2.
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Japanese governance mechanisms are usually characterized as bank- and relationship-
oriented, while Anglo-Saxon governance mechanisms are perceived as market-oriented.
There are pros and cons of Japanese governance mechanisms. According to some ob-
servers, Japanese governance mechanisms give internal management autonomy, and
management’s degree of freedom from bank control has a close positive correlation
with the level of corporate profit (e.g., Aoki [1]). In contrast, others view the lack
of transparency as one of the major obstacles to investment (e.g., Schulz [48]; Jones
[31]). Obviously, the internal management autonomy is a double-edged blade. As Jones
[31, pg. 12] comments,
...[it may result in] corporate decisions that are incomprehensible to outsiders.
This tendency can sometimes manifest itself in a course of systematic lying to outside
shareholders through falsified accounts or other deliberate misinformation. ...Cor-
porate scandals like Olympus are thus seized upon as yet another example of bad
“Japanese-style” management systems.
Implementation of performance-based compensation contracts is expected to provide
a major improvement in transparency. Currently, performance-based compensation is
exempted from Japanese corporate taxation by Corporate Tax Act No. 34. Until this
act was passed, the Japanese executive compensation system was starkly different from
those of western counterparts. Even a reasonable allowance for salaries, which is tax
deductible under Section 162 of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code, for instance, was not
allowed as a deduction under Japanese corporate tax law. The amendment made the
Japanese executive compensation system more easily understandable to people in west-
ern countries and allowed tax deductibility of performance-based compensation, regular
period compensation (e.g., salary), and pre-determined compensation.1 It is fair to say
that performance-based compensation is exempted from corporate taxation in order to
encourage firms to change their discretionary bonus contract practice to a performance-
based one that appears more market-oriented.
1Extra compensation qualifies as performance-based or pre-determined compensation if it was paid
on the basis of performance measures that appear in a firm’s financial reporting or if it was declared to
the tax office before the execution of a contract.
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Somewhat ironically, discretionary bonuses continued to be used considerably after
the introduction of the current terms of Corporate Tax Act No. 34. According to the
Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE), 87.1% of TSE-listed companies responded that they have
initiatives to offer incentives (Tokyo Stock Exchange [55]). Performance-based compen-
sation was introduced in 19.7% of the TSE-listed companies, and stock option plans and
“others” were introduced in 31.4% and 45.2% of the TSE-listed companies, respectively.
Out of 1,038 companies that selected “others”, 50.4% referred to either “remuneration”
or “bonus” in their supplementary explanation of initiatives. This suggests that each
year, several firms revised the salary component of their executive compensation on the
basis of the performance of the previous period, although some of the salary component
may be regarded as a discretionary bonus.
Several Japanese firms continue using an opaque bonus contract practice, contrary
to what authorities might have expected. However, Japanese firms have typically used
rank hierarchy as a primary incentive device (Aoki [1]). Therefore, rewards might not
be paid on the basis of performance measures, but instead are paid on the basis of
rank (Shirai and Inoue [51]). Thus, it is not obvious that a performance-based contract
improves Japanese executives’ work incentives. In other words, it is not known whether
a performance-based contract reduces moral hazard problems in Japanese governance
mechanisms because these mechanisms may already motivate executives to work hard.
The empirical evidence on the impact of the firms’ choice of executive compensation
contract is ambiguous. Kaplan [33] studies top executive compensation and its relation-
ship with firm performance in the largest Japanese and U.S. companies, and finds that
the relationship between executive compensation and performance in Japan and the U.S.
are statistically similar, although the corporate governance mechanisms in those coun-
tries are considered significantly different from each other. These results are supported
by Kato [34] and Basu et al. [4]. They identify that CEOs of keiretsu members earn less
than those of independent firms, and keiretsu could play a role as an effective Japanese
governance mechanism. On the other hand, Core et al. [10] find that U.S. firms with
weaker governance mechanisms had greater agency problems. Finally, Basu et al. [4]
find that Japanese firms with weaker governance mechanisms, in particular firms with
higher insider ownership, have greater agency problems.
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Motivated by the mixed empirical findings, this chapter theoretically studies the
consequences of the choice of two different types of executive compensation contracts.
The analysis is based on a career concerns model in which compensation contracts are
subject to renegotiation; compensation is paid on the basis of the agent’s earnings report
(e.g., a performance-based contract) or a non-verifiable measure within the firm (e.g.,
a conventional implicit contract). Career concerns were first formalized by Holmstro¨m
[26]. Gibbons and Murphy [20] and Meyer and Vickers [41] develop dynamic models with
explicit contracts based on the career concerns model of Holmstro¨m [26] and enable
analyses of the interplay between implicit dynamic incentives and explicit incentives.
Kaarbøe and Olsen [32] extend the work of Meyer and Vickers [41] by adding distorted
performance measures based on the multi-task agency model of Feltham and Xie [17].
Kaarbøe and Olsen [32] come closest to this chapter’s models; however, this chapter
takes a different approach when modeling distorted performance measures. Instead of
using the weights given to a performance measure as a degree of distortion, this chapter
uses biases that the agent can introduce into his earnings report in order to inflate his
performance evaluation. This chapter follows the work of Fischer and Verrecchia [18]
when modeling the agent’s biased reporting.
This chapter also relates to the literature on relational contracts (e.g., Bull [7]; Baker
et al. [2]; Levin [38]; MacLeod [40]). For example, Baker et al. [2] consider subjective
performance measures in implicit contracts and their model is similar in spirit to the one
in this chapter; however, the contract they consider is one in which a worker anticipates
that the employer could renege on a promise if their contract is implicit, and they focus
on the role of trust in enforcing implicit contracts. This chapter assumes that Japanese
firms’ discretionary bonus contracts are driven by career concerns as compared to trust.
In the first of two main results, this chapter shows that the conventional implicit
contract can dominate the performance-based contract if the agent’s bargaining power
is moderate and the non-verifiable measure within the firm is sufficiently informative,
making it unlikely that the agent’s earnings report will trigger renegotiation for the
second-period compensation contract. On the other hand, the second result shows that
the performance-based contract is optimal if the non-verifiable measure is not sufficiently
informative and the agent’s bargaining power is considerably strong. One interpretation
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of these results complements Aoki’s [1, pg. 12] description of the way in which rank
hierarchy works as an incentive:
The existence of a credible threat of discharge when the employee does not meet
the criteria for continual promotion plays an important role in enabling the rank
hierarchy to operate as an effective incentive to curb shirking. A discharge in mid-
career may point to some negative attributes of the discharged so that he or she
may not be able to gain equivalent rank outside, when information about him or
her is not perfect.
In these terms, the main results show that explicit contracts are not required when
executives have concerns that they may not be able to gain equivalent rank outside and
when information about them is not verifiable outside.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 explains the model
assumptions and derives the optimal contract in equilibrium. Section 4.3 theoretically
addresses whether the shareholders in Japanese firms would benefit from the use of
annual incentive plans. Section 4.4 provides the conclusion.
4.2 Model
4.2.1 Model Assumptions
Consider a two-period agency model with a risk neutral board of directors (the principal)
and a risk neutral and effort averse manager (the agent), who run the business on
behalf of the shareholders (the owner). Although shareholders are not active players,
the chapter assumes their presence. This is in order to emphasize the fact that non-
verifiable measures, which play an important role in this analysis, are observed only by
the contracting parties.
The key feature of this analysis is the consideration of two types of executive com-
pensation contracts: conventional implicit contracts and performance-based contracts.
At t = 0, the principal selects one of these two types of contracts and provides a take-it-
or-leave-it offer. The initial contract commits both parties to stay in the relationship for
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two periods, but does not preclude the possibility that the principal may reset the terms
of the contract, and in turn, the agent may terminate the employment relationship in
the case of a breakdown in renegotiation for the second period contract.However, to ease
exposition, once selected (and accepted by the agent), it is assumed that the form of
contract is not allowed to change for two periods. However, the parameters may change.
Figure 4.1 presents the timeline. At t = 0, a compensation contract is signed between
the principal and the agent. During the first period, the agent’s effort a1 generates
stochastic cash flow v1. The realized value of the cash flow is not directly observable to
anybody except the agent. After observing v1, the agent provides his earnings report
r1, which is potentially distorted by his bias b1. In addition to the agent’s earnings
report, the contracting parties (but not the shareholders) may observe the non-verifiable
measure s1, which is useful for subjective assessments of the agent’s contribution to the
value of the cash flow. At t = 1 the principal and the agent renegotiate the second-
period contract w2. The sequence of events is repeated in the second period except that
at the end of period two, no further contract negotiation takes place. At that point,
shareholders consume the residual income.
  



 


















 





Figure 4.1: Timeline
In the conventional implicit contract, compensation w¯t is assumed to consist of only
fixed payments, and the agent is motivated to work hard by career concerns. The
principal uses information about the agent’s current performance xt = (rt, st)′ to update
her beliefs about the agent’s ability, where xt is a column vector composed of the earnings
report rt and the non-verifiable measure st. st is the realization of the random variable
s˜t which is given by
s˜t = at + η˜ + ζ˜t,
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where at ∈ R denotes the agent’s effort in period t. The agent’s effort is not observable by
the principal (and shareholders). η˜ and ζ˜t are two independent normally distributed ran-
dom variables. It is assumed that η˜ has mean E[η˜] > 0 and variance σ2η and ζ˜t has mean
zero and variance σ2ζ . η˜ represents a manager’s unknown ability, which is related to the
agent’s contribution. ζ˜t represents errors in the assessment of the agent’s contribution.
The realized st is common knowledge to the contracting parties, but not verifiable to a
third party. This assumption corresponds closely with the Japanese firms’ discretionary
bonus contract practice in which the salary component in executive compensation is
revised on the basis of a subjective assessment (from shareholders’ perspective) in the
previous period. On the other hand, in the performance-based contract, compensation
wpert is assumed to be composed of fixed payments and variable (earnings-report-based)
payments.
wpert = α¯t + βtrt, (4.1)
where α¯t ≥ 0 is the fixed payment for period t and βt > 0 is an incentive coefficient for
period t. This assumption corresponds exactly with performance-based compensation
in Corporate Tax Act No. 34. It is assumed that the non-verifiable measure is not
available when the performance-based contract is selected, and information available for
the principal to update her beliefs is xt = rt.
The firm’s cash flow in each period results from the agent’s effort and ability and a
random factor. The firm’s cash flow in period t is given by the following expression:
vt = at + η + εt,
where η is the agent’s actual, unknown ability, εt is the realization of a normally dis-
tributed random variable ε˜t with mean zero and variance σ2ε . ε˜t denotes the impact of
uncontrollable events on a firm’s cash flow. Let ε˜t be independent of η˜ and of ζ˜t. The
realization of the cash flow in each period vt is not directly observable to anybody except
the agent until the end of the second period; however, the functional form of v˜t and the
distributions of noise and the agent’s ability are common knowledge.
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Observing the realization of the cash flow, the agent provides an earnings report to
the principal (and shareholders). The earnings report for period t is potentially biased,
as follows:
rt = vt + bt,
where bt ∈ R represents the bias introduced by the agent into the earnings report. bt is
not directly observed by the principal (and shareholders).
The agent is risk neutral and effort averse. It is assumed that exerting effort (both
constructive and destructive, i.e., at and bt) causes the agent to incur a private cost of
c(at, bt). The cost function is given by
c(at, bt) =
a2t
2
+
c · b2t
2
.
c is a known positive parameter and denotes the marginal impact of effort for providing
a biased report on the agent’s private cost. To reduce the number of parameters, the
marginal impact of productive effort at is assumed to be 1. When period t compensation
is offered as wt, the agent’s objective function is given as
CE = E[w˜1 + w˜2]− c(a1, b1)− c(a2, b2). (4.2)
Compensation wt may be a random variable when it depends on performance measures
that include random variables. The principal is risk-neutral, and her objective function
can be stated as
E[v˜1 + v˜2]− E[w˜1 + w˜2]. (4.3)
In order to make a contract, the principal considers two types of constraints. The first
type consists of the incentive constraints: the agent will choose at and bt to maximize
his expected utility. The second type consists of participation constraints: the principal
must offer the agent expected utility at least as high as the agent’s reservation wage.
Following Meyer and Vickers [41], the agent’s reservation wage depends on the total
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expected surplus. Let the total expected surplus at the start of the contract be Π:
Π = E[v˜1 + v˜2]− c(a1, b1)− c(a2, b2). (4.4)
If the agent’s bargaining power is B ∈ (0, 1), his reservation wage is BΠ and the
first-period participation constraint is given by
CE ≥ BΠ. (4.5)
Throughout the chapter it is assumed that the principal commits to satisfying the agent’s
participation constraints not only at the initial contract but also at the time of renego-
tiation.2
Setting the participation constraint in (4.5) as an equality3, the principal’s objective
function in (4.3) can be simplified as follows:
E[v˜1 + v˜2]− c(a1, b1)− c(a2, b2)−BΠ = (1−B)Π. (4.6)
Note that (1−B) is always positive.
4.2.2 Conventional Implicit Contracts
This section presents the model’s solution assuming that the conventional implicit con-
tract is selected. The modeling is based on the career concerns model of Holmstro¨m
[26]. First, the optimal contract in the second period is characterized.
2 As Meyer and Vickers [41] point out in their footnote 9, models along the lines of the career concerns
literature with a participation constraint of this form need to recognize the possibility that (i) if the
agent ’s expected productivity after the first period is extremely low, his efficient choice at that point
is to change firms, and (ii) the agent may initially plan to leave after the end of the first period (take-
the-money-and-run strategy). However, these possibilities are negligible as long as his ex ante expected
outputs at the first-period firm are sufficiently larger than those at other firms, or the agent is to receive
a sufficiently large lump-sum payment in the second period for remaining with his first-period firm. For
example, the first-period fixed payment may be paid at the beginning of the second period.
3The equality is satisfied under the optimal contract. Because the principal initiates a negotiation,
she will set compensation wt at the lowest level at which the agent is willing to accept the contract,
i.e., CE = BΠ. On the other hand, when CE = BΠ is satisfied, the participation constraints and the
agent’s outside opportunities give him the same level of expected utility. Because it is a take-it-or-leave-it
offer and this chapter supposes that the agent will not choose outside opportunities that give the same
expected utility as the principal’s offer, the agent will accept the principal’s offer.
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At the start of the second period the principal maximizes her share of the total
amount of second-period expected surplus:
(1−B)Π2 = (1−B)
{
E[v˜2|x1]− c(aˆ2, bˆ2)
}
, (4.7)
subject to the following two constraints:
a2, b2 ∈ argmax
a′2,b
′
2
{E[w˜2|x1]− c(a′2, b′2)}, (4.8)
E[w˜2|x1]− c(a2, b2) ≥ BΠ2, (4.9)
where aˆt and bˆt are the principal’s belief about the equilibrium amount of effort and
bias, respectively. The constraint in (4.8) is the incentive constraint and the constraint
in (4.9) is the agent’s participation constraint.
From the principal’s perspective, the total surplus Π2 can be rewritten as
Πcon2 = E[v˜2] + ρ
d
r1(r1 − E[r˜1|aˆ1, bˆ1]) + ρs1(s1 − E[s˜1|aˆ1])− c(aˆ2, bˆ2). (4.10)
ρdr1 reflects the marginal impact of the first-period earnings report r1 on the principal’s
belief about the second-period cash flow. Similarly, ρs1 reflects the marginal impact
of the first-period non-verifiable measure s1 on the principal’s belief about the second-
period cash flow. The exact expressions for the regression coefficients ρdr1 and ρs1 are
contained in Appendix A. It is noted that ρdr1, ρs1 ∈ (0, 1) and ρdr1 + ρs1 < 1.
To determine the agent’s optimal effort choice, recall that compensation w˜2 in (4.8)
is defined as a fixed payment. Because the agent’s efforts do not impact compensation,
his optimal effort choice is a2 = b2 = 0.
Considering the agent’s bargaining power, the principal offers a contract to satisfy
the participation constraint. Setting (4.9) as an equality and substituting a2 = b2 = 0,
w¯2 is given by
w¯con2 (x1) = BE[v˜2|x1]. (4.11)
The symbol “con” is used to denote that it is satisfied in the optimal conventional
implicit contract. Note that the second-period contract w¯con2 (x1) in (4.11) depends on
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x1 = (r1, s1)′. This comes from the fact that the principal updates her belief about
the agent’s ability η˜ by observing x1. Thus, w¯con2 (x1) gives an implicit incentive to the
agent in the first period, i.e., career concerns are present in the first period. Recall that
w¯con2 (x1) does not give any incentive to the agent in the second period, i.e., a2 = b2 = 0.
Thus, both the earnings report and the non-verifiable measure are used to provide only
implicit incentives in the conventional implicit contract.
The first-period problem is solved in a similar manner. The principal’s problem at
t = 0 is to maximize her objective function in (4.6) subject to the participation constraint
in (4.5) and the incentive constraint
a1, b1 ∈ argmax
a′1,b
′
1
{CE}. (4.12)
Because the second-period compensation w¯con2 (x1) in (4.11) depends on x1 = (r1, s1)
′,
the agent has an incentive to exert effort in the first period to increase w¯con2 (x1). Thus,
the agent’s incentive constraint can be rewritten as
a1, b1 ∈ argmax
a′1,b
′
1
{w¯con2 (x1)− c(a′1, b′1)},
for which the solution is
acon1 = B(ρ
d
r1 + ρs1), (4.13)
bcon1 =
1
c
Bρdr1. (4.14)
Setting (4.5) as an equality, w¯1 is given by
w¯con1 = B (a
con
1 + E[η]) + (1−B)c(acon1 , bcon1 ). (4.15)
Substituting compensations in (4.11) and (4.15) and the agent’s induced efforts, the
total expected surplus for the conventional implicit contract Πcon is given by
Πcon = −1
2
[
(ρdr1 + ρs1)
2 +
1
c
(ρdr1)
2
]
B2 + (ρdr1 + ρs1)B + 2E[η˜].
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Πcon is used in Section 4.3 when the principal compares her share of the total expected
surplus for each type of contract.
4.2.3 Performance-based contracts
In this section, the optimal contract for the performance-based contract is derived. The
modeling is based on dynamic models with explicit contracts developed by prior litera-
ture (e.g., Baker et al. [2]; Meyer and Vickers [41]; Kaarbøe and Olsen [32]). Similar to
the aforementioned conventional implicit contract, the principal maximizes her objective
function in (4.7) subject to constraints in (4.8) and (4.9) at t = 1. From (4.7) and the
fact that the information available for the principal is now x1 = r1, the total expected
surplus Π2 from principal’s perspective can be written as
Πper2 = E[v˜2] + ρr1(r1 − E[r˜1|aˆ1, bˆ1])− c(aˆ2, bˆ2). (4.16)
The symbol “per” is used to denote that it is satisfied in the optimal performance-based
contract. ρr1 reflects the marginal impact of the first-period earnings report on the prin-
cipal’ belief about the second-period cash flow. Note that the regression coefficient ρr1 is
different from ρdr1 which was given in the aforementioned conventional implicit contract.
For the principal the first-period earnings report in the performance-based contract is
the sole source of information about the agent’s efforts and ability. In contrast, in the
conventional implicit contract the principal can use not only the first-period earnings
report, but also the first-period non-verifiable measure. Thus, the impacts of the first-
period earnings report ρr1 in the performance-based contract are bigger than ρdr1 in the
conventional implicit contract for the principal. The exact expression is contained in
Appendix A.
For determining the agent’s optimal effort choice, first consider the expectation of
his compensation at t = 1. For the contract defined in (4.1), it is given by
E[w˜2|x1] = α¯2 + β2 {E[v˜2|x1] + b2}− c(a2, b2). (4.17)
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Substituting (4.17) in the constraint in (4.8), the agent’s optimal effort choice is given
by
aper2 = β2, (4.18)
bper2 =
1
c
β2. (4.19)
Maximizing (4.7) with respect to β2 and considering the agent’s induced efforts in (4.18)
and (4.19), the incentive weight of the optimal contract at t = 1 is given by
β∗2 =
c
c+ 1
. (4.20)
The fixed component of the agent’s compensation α¯2 is determined in a manner that
satisfies the constraint in (4.9). This is given by
α¯∗2(x1) = (B − β∗2)E[v˜2|x1]−
1
c
(β∗2)
2 + (1−B)
[
1
2
(β∗2)
2 +
1
2c
(β∗2)
2
]
.
Therefore, the second-period wage contract offered to the agent is
wper2 (x1) = α¯
∗
2(x1) + β
∗
2r2. (4.21)
Note that the second-period fixed payment α¯∗2(x1) in (4.21) depends on the first-period
earnings report r1. However, the optimal second-period incentive payment β∗2r2 in (4.21)
does not depend on r1, because it is an explicit contract based on the second-period
earnings report r2.
Next, consider the first-period problem. The principal’s problem at t = 0 is to
maximize her objective function (4.6) subject to the constraints in (4.12) and (4.5).
Recall that the agent’s second-period fixed payment α¯∗2(x1) in (4.21) depends on his
first-period earnings report r1. Thus, the incentive constraint in (4.12) can be written
as
a1, b1 ∈ argmax
a′1,b
′
1
{E[β1r˜1] + E[α¯∗2(x1)]− c(a′1, b′1)}, (4.22)
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for which the solution is
aper1 = β1 + µr1, (4.23)
bper1 =
1
c
(β1 + µr1) , (4.24)
where µr1 = (B − β∗2)ρr1 is the implicit incentive to increase the second-period fixed
payment. The sign of µr1 is ambiguous. It is positive when B >
c
1+c and negative when
B < c1+c .
Considering the agent’s optimal effort choice and maximizing (4.6) with respect to
βˇ1, βˇ1 = β1 + µr1, the incentive weight of the optimal contract at t = 0 is given by
βˇ∗1 =


c
1+c B < BF ,
µr1 B > BF ,
(4.25)
where BF =
c(1+ρr1)
(1+c)ρr1
. Note that the incentive weight of the performance-based contract
in (4.1) is defined as positive, i.e., β1 > 0. Perhaps when βˇ∗1 = µr1 is satisfied, the
contract can be defined as a semi-performance-based contract because it provides a
direct incentive only in the second period. Thus, BF is the threshold above which the
semi-performance-based contract has to be offered instead of the performance-based
contract.
Setting (4.5) as an equality and considering the agent’s optimal action choice and
the optimal incentive weights, the first-period fixed payment is given by
α¯∗1 = (B − βˇ∗1)E[v˜1] + (1−B)c(βˇ∗1 ,
1
c
βˇ∗1)− β1(
1
c
βˇ∗1)− µr1E[r˜1]. (4.26)
Note that a long-term linear contract in which the fixed payment is α1+(α2−µr1r1)
and the incentive coefficient for rt is always
c
1+c would be a renegotiation-proof contract.
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The total expected surplus for the performance-based contract Πper and that for the
semi-performance-based contract ΠperF are given by
Πper =
c
1 + c
+ 2E[η˜],
ΠperF = −
1 + c
2c
[(
c
1 + c
)2
+ µ2r1
]
+
c
1 + c
+ µr1 + 2E[η˜].
Note that Πper ≥ ΠperF is satisfied (and the equation is satisfied when B = BF ). Recall
that Πper is computed to be the optimal total surplus.
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Figure 4.2: Agent’s induced actions
Figure 4.2 shows the agent’s induced actions in equilibrium. For example, PER
(CON) effort indicates the sum of the first- and the second- period effort of the performance-
based contract (the conventional implicit contract). The x-axis measures the bargaining
power scale. When c is larger than one, the agent’s cost of introducing bias is higher than
that of exerting productive effort. Thus, the line of induced effort is always above the line
of induced bias in each contract. In this case, the effort exerted in the performance-based
contract is always higher than that in the conventional contract.
On the other hand, when c is less than ρr1 and ρs1 is sufficiently large, i.e., the non-
verifiable measure is sufficiently informative, the agent’s preference for effort and bias
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is completely opposite in each contract. Importantly, when c is less than ρr1 and ρs1 is
sufficiently large, the bias of the performance-based contract is always higher than that
of the conventional implicit contract, and in some interval, the effort of the conventional
implicit contract is higher than that of performance-based contract.
4.3 Choice of the Type of Contracts
In this section, the optimal choice of the type of contract is derived. At the start of
period 1, the principal compares her share of the total expected surplus for each type.
The following proposition summarizes the results.
Proposition 4.1. Suppose σ2ζ = kσ
2
ε , k > 0.
(i) For c ≥ 1, the performance-based contract is optimal.
(ii) For c < 1, kcon(c) exists such that kcon(c) is a decreasing function in c and
• For k > kcon(c), the performance-based contract is optimal over B ∈ (0, 1) if
c > ρr1, and over B ∈ (0, BF ) if c < ρr1;
• For k < kcon(c), ccon ∈ (0, 1), Bcon and Bexp, 0 < Bcon < Bexp, exists such that
for c < ccon the conventional implicit contract is optimal over B ∈ (Bcon, Bexp) if
Bexp ≤ min(BF , 1), and over B ∈ (Bcon, min(Bexp, 1)) if Bexp > min(BF , 1).
All proofs are in Appendix B.
The intuition behind these results is straightforward. When the private cost of intro-
ducing bias into an earnings report is higher than that of exerting productive effort for
the agent, i.e., c ≥ 1, the performance-based contract in which the performance measure
serves as an incentive to work hard dominates the conventional implicit contract. Fur-
thermore, even though introducing bias into an earnings report is an easier choice for
the agent, i.e., c < 1, when the non-verifiable measure is not informative enough, i.e.,
k > kcon, the performance-based contract is still the optimal choice for the principal. On
the other hand, when reporting with bias is an easier choice for the agent, i.e., c < 1, and
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the non-verifiable measure is sufficiently informative so that the agent’s earnings report
does not consider renegotiation for the next compensation contract, i.e., k < kcon(c), the
conventional implicit contract could dominate its counterpart. Note that the coefficient
k in σ2ζ = kσ
2
ε could be a measure of relative informativeness. A lower coefficient k re-
flects a superior non-verifiable measure’s relative informativeness to the earnings report.
Recall that the shareholders observe only the agent’s earnings report. It can be said that
when the non-verifiable measure works well the agent works hard despite the fact that
his contribution is assessed with an opaque decision process from the shareholders’ per-
spective, which is often observed in Japanese management mechanisms. These results
correspond to the empirical evidence provided by Kaplan [33] , Kato [34], and Basu et al.
[4]. These studies report that a relationship-oriented governance mechanism works as
well as a market-oriented governance mechanism. Arguably, non-verifiable measures in
relationship-oriented governance mechanisms are sufficiently informative because they
provide common consent, which can be interpreted as that in which a non-verifiable
measure would play an important role in relationship-oriented mechanisms.
However, it is not the case if the agent’s bargaining power B is in the range (0, Bcon]∪
(Bexp,min(BF , 1)). In particular, when the agent’s bargaining power is consider-
ably strong, i.e., B ∈ (Bexp, min(BF , 1)), the conventional implicit contract allows
the agent to provide a biased earnings report and get excess compensation as com-
pared to the performance-based contract. The following corollary shows that inequality
Bexp < min(BF , 1) is satisfied and a non-empty set (Bexp, min(BF , 1)), in which the
performance-based contract is optimal, exists.
Corollary 4.2. Suppose c < ρr1 and k < k
con. If k is sufficiently close to kcon(c),
ρexp ∈ (0, 1] exists such that for ρr1 < ρexp, Bexp < BF < 1 is satisfied and the
performance-based contract is optimal over B ∈ (Bexp, BF ).
In other words, when the non-verifiable measure in the conventional implicit contract
is relatively uninformative and when the marginal impact of the earnings report in
the performance-based contract ρr1 is weaker, i.e., ρr1 < ρexp, the performance-based
contract can dominate the conventional implicit contract depending on the strength of
the agent’s bargaining power. The results imply a scenario: the conventional implicit
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contract may be chosen by managers who have strong bargaining power as compared
to the board of directors, although a performance-based contract could be optimal for
their firms. This scenario is consistent with Basu et al. [4], who find that top Japanese
executives earn more in firms with higher insider ownership.
Figure 4.3 characterizes the case where the assumptions of Corollary 4.2 and c < ccon
are satisfied.
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Figure 4.3: Difference of the total surplus
4.3.1 Empirical Implications
On the basis of the aforementioned results, implications for empirical compensation
research can be discussed. First, the firms’ executive compensation policy (e.g., how di-
rectors are paid) is may not serve as a useful test in identifying profitable firms. A change
in the pay policy from discretionary to performance-based bonus contract practice is not
expected to have a positive relationship with firm performance. This prediction is con-
sistent with Kubo [37], who analyzes whether a firm’s method of paying its directors
matters, although the current study does not agree with his conclusion that executive
compensation is not designed to motivate executives to work towards increasing share-
holder value. Second, the combination of the firms’ executive compensation policy and
ownership structure is likely to be associated with the level of executive compensation.
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If firms with higher insider ownership continue to use a conventional contract, they may
experience higher agency costs.
4.4 Conclusion
This chapter studies the consequences of the choice of two types of executive com-
pensation contracts. The analysis is based on a two-period agency model in which
compensation contracts are subject to renegotiation; compensation is paid on the basis
of the agent’s earnings report (e.g., a performance-based contract) or a non-verifiable
measure within the firm (e.g., a conventional implicit contract). The analysis shows that
assessment of the agent’s contribution based on an earnings report creates incentives for
providing a biased report; these incentives could significantly distort the structure of
the optimal-compensation contract. The effect makes the conventional implicit contract
optimal if the non-verifiable measure within the firm is sufficiently informative and the
agent’s bargaining power is moderate. In contrast, if the non-verifiable measure is not
sufficiently informative and the agent has strong bargaining power, the conventional im-
plicit contract motivates the agent to provide a biased report and the performance-based
contract becomes optimal.
These results imply two different scenarios. First, Japanese firms use the conventional
implicit contract because top executives in those firms are motivated to work hard by
subjective assessments of their contribution to firm value, though it can be seen as an
opaque decision process by shareholders. Second, the conventional implicit contract is
chosen by top executives who have strong bargaining power as compared to the board of
directors, although their non-verifiable measures are relatively uninformative and so a
performance-based contract could be optimal for their firms. Therefore, the shareholders
in firm with Japanese governance mechanisms would not always benefit from the use of
annual incentive plans.
As long as the Japanese governance mechanisms are working well, implementation
of a performance-based compensation contract may give excessive rewards to executives
who are already motivated to work hard. A performance-based compensation contract
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would not be what improves firms’ transparency but it seems to work well in firms that
already have a transparent governance mechanism.
Although this chapter has applied classic agency theory, which is built upon the
assumption that there is a conflict of interest between a principal and an agent, it is
easy to imagine analyses relaxing the assumption. For example, further insights on
performance-based measures under various control mechanisms can be generated by
introducing a goal congruent agent.4
APPENDIX A
Regression Coefficients
The covariance matrix (v˜2, r˜1, s˜1) is


σ2η + σ
2
ε σ
2
η σ
2
η
σ2η σ
2
η + σ
2
ε σ
2
η
σ2η σ
2
η σ
2
η + σ
2
ζ

 .
By applying well-known formulas for multivariate normal distributions (e.g., DeGroot
[14]),
ρdr1 =
σ2ησ
2
ζ
σ2ησ
2
ζ + σ
2
εσ
2
η + σ
2
εσ
2
ζ
,
ρs1 =
σ2ησ
2
ε
σ2ησ
2
ζ + σ
2
εσ
2
η + σ
2
εσ
2
ζ
,
ρr1 =
σ2η
σ2η + σ2ε
.
4For example, this kind of analysis is conducted by Banker et al. [3]. They integrate agency theory and
organizational control theory and study three types of control: outcome based control; behavior-based
control; and clan control.
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APPENDIX B
Proof of Proposition 4.1
Let ∆Π = Πcon −Πper and ∆ΠF = Πcon −ΠperF . Recall that (1− B) is positive. Hence
(1 − B)∆Π and ∆Π have the same sign, and (1 − B)∆ΠF and ∆ΠF also have the
same sign, ∆Π and ∆ΠF can be taken as the principal’s measure of the optimal type
of contract. To examine the sign of ∆Π, the discriminant of ∆Π is evaluated. From
σ2ζ = kσ
2
ε , ρ
d
r1 can be written as ρ
d
r1 = kρs1. Substituting the expression, ∆Π can be
rewritten as
∆Π = −1
2
[
(1 + k)2 +
1
c
k2
]
ρ2s1B
2 + (1 + k)ρs1B − c1 + c .
The discriminant of ∆Π is given by
D =
ρ2s1
1 + c
[
(1− c)(1 + k)2 − 2k2] .
( i ) For c ≥ 1. Because the discriminant of ∆Π is negative, i.e., D < 0, ∆Π has no real
roots. Because the coefficient of B2 in ∆Π is negative, ∆Π is the parabola that opens
downwards. Thus, the sign of ∆Π is negative for all B. Further, for c > 1, BF > 1
over all ρr1 ∈ (0, 1). Therefore, the performance-based contract is optimal over all
B ∈ (0, 1).
(ii) For c < 1. To determine the sign of the discriminant of ∆Π, denote ψ(k) = (1 −
c)(1 + k)2 − 2k2. The discriminant of ψ(k) is given by 8(1 − c) > 0. Thus, ψ(k) has
two real roots. Because the coefficient of k2 in ψ(k) is negative, ψ(k) is a parabola that
opens downwards. The roots are given by
1− c−
p
2(1− c)
1 + c
, and,
1− c+
p
2(1− c)
1 + c
.
Let kcon =
1−c+
√
2(1−c)
1+c . Note that k
con is a decreasing in c. Because the sign of
1−c−
√
2(1−c)
1+c is negative and that of k
con is positive, ψ(k) > 0 for k ∈ [0, kcon) and
ψ(k) < 0 for k > kcon is known.
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For k > kcon. The discriminant of ∆Π is negative, i.e., D < 0. Thus, ∆Π < 0 over all
B ∈ (0, 1). Taking account of the fact that if c < ρr1 the performance-based contract
is unfeasible over B ∈ [BF , 1), it can be said that the performance-based contract is
optimal, over B ∈ (0, 1) if c > ρr1, and over B ∈ (0, BF ) if c < ρr1.
For k < kcon. Because the discriminant of ∆Π is positive, ∆Π has two real roots. These
roots are given by
(1 + k)−
q
1
1+c [(1− c)(1 + k)
2
− 2k2]
ˆ
(1 + k)2 + 1
c
k2
˜
ρs1
, and,
(1 + k) +
q
1
1+c [(1− c)(1 + k)
2
− 2k2]
ˆ
(1 + k)2 + 1
c
k2
˜
ρs1
.
Let Bcon =
(1+k)−
q
1
1+c [(1−c)(1+k)2−2k2]
[(1+k)2+ 1
c
k2]ρs1
and Bexp =
(1+k)+
q
1
1+c [(1−c)(1+k)2−2k2]
[(1+k)2+ 1
c
k2]ρs1
. One knows that
∆Π > 0 over B ∈ (Bcon, Bexp). The fact that ∆Π(0) is negative implies that Bcon > 0
and Bexp > 0. Because the limit of Bcon as c approaches zero is zero, ccon ∈ (0, 1)
exists such that for c < ccon, Bcon < 1 is satisfied. Recall that ∆ΠF ≥ ∆Π for all
B. If Bexp > BF and ∆Π > 0 over B ∈ (Bcon, Bexp), ∆ΠF > 0 is satisfied over B ∈
(BF , Bexp). Thus, the conventional implicit contract is optimal, over B ∈ (Bcon, Bexp)
if Bexp ≤ min(BF , 1), and over B ∈ (Bcon, min(Bexp, 1)) if Bexp > min(BF , 1) . This
completes the proof of Proposition 4.1.
Proof of Corollary 4.2
Let the vertex of ∆Π be (Bv, ∆Π(Bv)). Because ∆Π(k) is continuous, the roots of
∆Π can be made to be as close to Bv as desired by making k sufficiently close to
kcon. Thus, when Bv < BF is satisfied, inequality Bv < Bexp < BF can be derived
by making k sufficiently close to kcon. Consider now when inequality Bv < BF is
satisfied. Inequality Bv < BF can be rewritten as
[
(1 + 1c )Bv − 1
]
< 1ρr1 . Denote
ψ(c, k) =
(
1 + 1c
)
Bv − 1. When k = kcon, ψ(c, kcon) > 0 is satisfied. Suppose c is fixed
somewhere in (0, ρr1). Because ψ(c, k) is a continuous function, for any number ε > 0,
some number δ > 0 exists such that for all k, |k− kcon| < δ ⇒ |ψ(c, k)−ψ(c, kcon)| < ε.
Thus, ψ(c, k) > 0 in the neighbourhood U = {(c, k)||k − kcon| < δ, c ∈ (0, ρr1)}.
Let ρexp = min{ 1ψ(c,k) , 1}, (c, k) ∈ U . If ρr1 < ρexp, ψ(c, k) < 1ρexp < 1ρr1 . This
indicates that Bv < BF is satisfied over (c, k) ∈ U . From the proof of Proposition 1,
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∆Π < 0 over B ∈ (Bexp, BF ]. Therefore, the performance-based contract is optimal over
B ∈ (Bexp, BF ). This completes the proof of Corollary 4.2.
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